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Abstract Cultural policy in Singapore arguably takes on a ‘policing’ dimension, as it is 
typically about media censorship vis-à-vis the maintenance of social and political 
control. At the same time, it aims to extract economic productivity from citizens 
working in the arts and cultural sector. This paper analyses the cultural mentality of 
the Singapore government by taking a new look cultural policy positions in Singapore. 
It provides a brief summary of recent policy statements, namely: Singapore 21 (1999) 
and The Renaissance City Report (2000), and looks at how these messages of (re) 
forming culture are relayed and popularised to the Singaporean public. To ensure that 
these messages reach and engage the people, the Singapore Government employs a 
mass popularisation strategy where popular cultural items – most notably national 
pop-songs, music video clips and images of Singapore as youthful and ‘cool’ – are 
heavily mobilised. As this paper will evince, the lyrics and mediated video images of 
national songs are not only powerful purveyors of the myth of nationhood, they are 
also essential tools of national culture and policy. This approach, as this paper will 
argue, has an immediate dual effect of reinforcing the hegemony of the economic and 
the legitimisation of the political in Singapore. 
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Realising the ‘Reality’ of Singapore 
[T]his is one of the greatest strengths about Singapore: its willingness to 
face reality including the 9
th of August. […] Every year, on this 9
th August 
for many years ahead – how many, I do not know – we will dedicate 
ourselves anew to consolidate ourselves to survive; and most important of 
all, to find an enduring future for what we have built and what our forbears 
will build up. 
Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister of Singapore, at the first National Day Rally 
Speech, 8
th August 1966). 
On the eve of the first anniversary of an independent Republic of Singapore, 8
th 
August 1966, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew delivered his inaugural National Day 
Rally Speech to the nation
2. Among other things, Lee recounted the unpleasant chain 
of events leading to Singapore’s sudden (r)ejection from Malaysia on 9
th August 1965. 
The official reason was that Malaysian leaders appeared unwilling to officially 
embrace a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ agenda, where non-communalist politics and multi­
racial integration were paramount (Lee, 1965; see also Ministry of Culture, 1966). In 
short, Singapore was to become the antithesis of Malaysia. In his speech, Lee 
reiterated his government’s social and cultural policy of multiracialism – 
encompassing the well-rehearsed traits of multilingualism, multiculturalism, and of 
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was filled with politically-charged innuendos and the rhetoric of national survival as 
national culture. 
Lee forged Singapore’s national ‘reality’ with his decree that every 9
th August was to 
be set aside as a day of dedication. Lee’s original idea of a ‘national day’ bears little 
semblance to the pomp and pageantry or the ‘carnivalesque’ elements of 
contemporary National Day Parades (NDP)
3.  National Day envisaged by Lee had a 
phlegmatic demeanour, akin to a memorial service to honour victims or veterans of a 
war. Lee’s intention was always to orchestrate the invention of a state-defined 
Singaporean national culture/identity (see Velayuthum, 1995: 42). Although the 
precise shape and definition of a ‘Singaporean’ culture remains vague and 
contentious to this day, it was made patently clear from the outset that it had to be 
distinct from Malaysian culture/identity. Multiracialism as non-communalism yet 
communitarian in practice became the founding and foundational cultural policy of 
modern Singapore. 
Singapore’s National Day has always been a prime site for the articulation of national 
strategic directions. It is an excellent opportunity for the ruling People Action Party 
(PAP) government to announce and ‘soft-sell’ new policy agendas. Despite the 
historical, political and cultural gravity of Singapore’s National Day, not many critical 
insights have been proffered on the event, with the exception of the usual journalistic 
reports and government statements. Comments on Singapore’s National Day have 
tended to focus on its grandeur and levels of nationalism (if at all measurable) invoked 
at the annual Parade
4. To the extent that it has become a cliché to consider the 
Parade a highly ritualised and stylised attempt at cultivating nationalist sentiments, 
thus developing a habitus of the ‘imagined communities’ of nationality (a la Benedict 
Anderson’s widely acclaimed work, 1983). This by-now familiar perspective is taken 
on board by Singaporean sociologist Leong Wai-Teng (1999) in his analysis of the 
NDP as a commodity to be consumed by two fairly disparate groups of Singaporeans: 
the ‘believers’ of the myth of the Singapore ‘nation’ and the ‘unbelievers’. The 
believers are simply those who are mostly convinced that Singapore is governed by 
the best possible bureaucrats and power-holders; whereas the unbelievers are the 
not-so-patriotic citizens, described by Leong as ‘repressed consumers’ who prefer to 
find other modes of distraction. Some of these take full advantage of the 9
th August 
public holiday for a brief overseas escape (Leong, 1999: 12). Theresa Devashayam 
(1990) makes a similar observation when she highlights the significance of identities’ 
formation within the annual NDP, and the resulting (lack of) response from the people. 
Another approach is to treat the NDP as a media and/or mediatory event. Irvin Lim’s 
(1999) semiotic cum textual analysis of the live-telecasting of the 1993 NDP on 
Singapore national television offers an excellent case study. As Lim points out, the 
media(ted) spectacle of the NDP is a very powerful tool in engendering public 
consumption and ‘staged’ participation of this national event. Selvaraj Velayutham 
(1995) takes a slightly different approach when he positions the NDP as a mediatory 
event aimed at publicising and negotiating the differences, divisions, conflicts and 
contradictions inherent in disciplined multiracial multi-religious, multilingual and 
multicultural society (see Purushotam, 1998). As Velayutham notes, the NDP is 
actively involved in processes of identity mediation and the management of difference 
for “the purpose of positioning the nation and the character of its people” for the sake 
of economic progress (Velayutham, 1995: abstract).  
Whilst acknowledging the aforementioned mediatory and other signifying practices of 
the annual National Day Parade, this paper aims to accentuate the importance of new 
populist or popularisation strategies adopted by the Singapore Government in its 
annual planning and execution of the National Day celebratory events in recent years. 
As this paper will argue, whilst the date of 9
th August has been kept since Lee Kuan 
Yew’s ordination, the elements, style and focus of the event have shifted with the 
times. For instance, the concept of a national ‘celebration’ surfaced only in August 
1969, three years after the first National Day event. Prior to that, the emphasis was 
Asia Pacific Journal of Arts and Cultural Management Vol. 2 Issue 1 June 2004 pp 55-69 © University of South Australia ISSN 1449-1184  56 mostly on being and becoming different from the neighbouring country. 
The 4
th National Day Message delivered by Colonel R. J. Minjoot, Chairman of the 
1969 National Day Parade Committee, elucidates the cause and purpose of 
celebration: 
We celebrate each National Day with unfeigned happiness and pride for this is 
the day that is dedicated to the people of Singapore. We celebrate the 
achievements of the past year and take note of our failings and we set our 
minds and steel our hearts to carry the nation forward to yet another milestone 
of progress in the coming year 
(Colonel R. J. Minjoot, in National Day Parade 9
th August, 1969). 
Since then, the concept of ‘celebration’ has become the sine qua non of the annual 
National Day event, with each National Day becoming more elaborate and each 
Parade promising greater fanfare and spectacle. As a result, younger generations are 
either unaware of the ‘reality’ of Singapore’s independence or are simply uninterested 
in dull, historical details. As a matter of fact, the National Day celebrations of recent 
years have become ‘mass entertainment’ (Chng, 2000). Yet, rather than decry the 
lack of interest shown by the people, the Singapore government has decided on a 
strategy of ‘popularisation’ to win over hearts and minds of Singaporeans, especially 
those belonging to the ‘unbelievers’ category. 
If successfully implemented, the popularisation of events and symbols associated with 
Singapore’s National Day has an immense potential to change social and cultural 
attitudes. Whereas listening to a speech delivered by the eloquent Lee Kuan Yew was 
a popular activity in those days (perhaps even today), it would certainly be difficult to 
incite and excite the same crowd fervour and participation today. Likewise, while the 
national days of yesteryears emphasised the pertinence of political survival and 
nation-building, the National Day of present times would have to reflect the changing 
social, cultural and political demands of the present and future Singaporeans. 
Nevertheless, there was – and still is – a need to engage the people in as many ways 
as possible. This is where the cultural policy cum strategy of popularisation comes 
into play. By popularising national events and symbols, the ‘nation’ becomes socially, 
culturally and aesthetically pleasing, even entertaining, to the ordinary consumer as 
citizen, thus rendering the often arduous task of communicating government 
messages and policy ideas more manageable. The move towards creating an 
atmosphere of celebration and entertainment via the popularisation of national events, 
songs and symbols can also be perceived as a strategy of engagement, where 
Singaporeans – especially the young and/or the politically-less-informed – would be 
incited to participate by internalising the sights and sounds of nationhood. 
This paper considers Singapore’s cultural policy by looking at the National Day 
celebration of the year 2000 and the discourse of national songs. It aims to show how 
the nation’s cultural policy is asserted and framed in and through the promotion of fun 
and entertainment as well as the popularisation of media and cultural products. This 
paper takes a particular interest in the audio cum visual making – and remaking – of a 
few well-known national songs (MITA Media Release, Aug 3, 2000). The composition 
and commissioning of heart-moving national songs has arguably emerged as one of 
the most powerful and successful popularisation strategy adopted by the Singapore 
government. By analysing the lyrics and video images portrayed by these national 
songs, one can gather or make sense of Singapore’s cultural policy and direction. 
Popular Policy 
[C]ultural displays can be used to say new things, foster new 
understandings, promote old ones, valorize and legitimate stances by 
governments, peoples, or communities (Kurin, 1995: 12). 
Since Singapore’s independence, National Day organisers and their respective  
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hardened’ Singaporeans. Visually appealing items such as laser shows, fireworks, 
military hardware displays and stunts, free-falling commandos, multi-coloured floats, 
mass flashcard and other cultural displays have become a regular part of the National 
Day Parade programme. The mobilisation of a celebratory mood and an atmosphere 
of fun are equally, if not more, important to incite crowd participation. Far from merely 
symbolising the nation’s survival, the 9
th of August has become possibly the most 
popular social and cultural event in Singapore. Its popularity is comparable to a sell­
out rock music concert, with aspiring spectators having to queue overnight, often for 
more than twelve hours, just to obtain two tickets to the big parade (The Straits Times 
Interactive, Jul 2, 2000).  Those unable to obtain tickets would have to be contented 
with live telecast via the ubiquitous television set. Alternatively, one could go online to 
find out more about ‘National Day Special’ or watch the NDP ‘live’ over Internet 
webcast, options made available to the digitally-advanced since the 1994 National 
Day (Teo, 2000). Not only is the NDP webcast a powerful demonstration of 
Singapore’s technological competence and readiness for the new information 
economy, it enables the transcendence of the traditional domestic sphere of a 
national audience to a greater global audience, reaching out particularly to 
Singaporeans residing abroad (Lim, 1999: 142). 
The NDP is irrefragably a great source of entertainment, with the live-telecast of the 
NDP consistently attaining one of the highest free-to-air television ratings, the degree 
of patriotism and/or national pride instilled, if at all quantifiable, remains somewhat 
questionable. Leong suggests that for some, a less than desirable motive for 
attending the Parade is to receive the free parade kit containing a wide range of 
goodies and discount vouchers (Leong, 1999: 11). On August 8, 2000, The Straits 
Times daily reported that the much-coveted tickets to the NDP were being sold on the 
Internet for amounts ranging from S$50 to S$250 or more per ticket (Arshad, 2000: 1). 
These transactions occurred in spite of a “Not For Sale” note printed at the back of 
each ticket, with sellers using ‘free-market’ reasons to justify their greed and buyers 
rationalising the ‘black market’ price as a ‘token of appreciation’ for long hours of 
queuing.  
Like any other forms of popular culture, Singapore’s National Day – the Parade as 
well as the event in general – is a discursive site of meaning-making and contestation. 
It is ideally suited for debates surrounding the imaginary status of the ‘nation’, as 
exemplified in issues pertaining to national identity and culture, shared values, 
patriotism and parochialism, and so on. For example, as National Day approaches 
every year, the national press finds itself inundated with letters about the 
representation of the national flag and whether displaying it outside one’s home 
signifies patriotism (Leong, 1999: 12). Debates of such nature are always-already 
polarised, even futile, with some believing that raising the flag demonstrates national 
pride (The Straits Times, Jul 31, 2000: 36), and others arguing that true patriotism or 
loyalty to the nation needs no public showcasing (The Straits Times Interactive, Aug 
1, 2000). Of course, there are yet others who are simply unperturbed or unmoved. 
These people would fit neatly into the aforementioned category of ‘unbelievers’ 
advanced by Leong (1999). The hoisting of a national flag, however, is circumscribed 
by the rules and regulations governing its public display and use. According to a 
Ministry of Information and the Arts memorandum (issued in May 2000), not only are 
the flags to be raised strictly between August 1 to 31 every year, each flag must be 
treated with utmost respect:  
The flag must also be washed and dried indoors separately, and not together 
with other laundry. If it is torn or worn-out, it should be disposed of by packing it 
in a sealed, black trash bag. Or it can be handed to the nearest Residents’ 
Committee or community centre for disposal  
(The Straits Times Interactive, May 26 and Jul 7, 2000). 
With clear instructions for virtually all occasions, Singapore’s notoriety as a well-
regulated – or perhaps over-regulated – nanny state is made manifest here. While it 
Asia Pacific Journal of Arts and Cultural Management Vol. 2 Issue 1 June 2004 pp 55-69 © University of South Australia ISSN 1449-1184  58 remains uncertain if the abovementioned rules pertaining to the state flag are properly 
adhered to, what is interesting is the way in which in contestation of ideas and 
meanings take place in Singapore. From an issue as mundane as how to, or whether 
or not to display the national flag, one catches a glimpse of the PAP government’s 
highly measured but successful approach to policy administration, demonstrated in 
and by its exactitude in rule-making. At the end of the day, strangely enough, most 
Singaporean homes can be found neatly adorned with the national flag and other 
decorative ornaments – but whether this is done proudly or perfunctorily, as an annual 
decorative ritual without much afterthought, remains a moot point. 
The host of events and debates that characterises Singapore’s National Day makes it 
an ideal site for the articulation of cultural policy, understood here as the “clash of 
ideas, institutional struggles and power relations in the production and circulation of 
symbolic meanings” (McGuigan, 1996)
5. Singaporean authorities are well aware of the 
need to constantly produce and circulate new symbolic meanings with the sole aim of 
maintaining political power via the control, or to use Foucault’s (1977) term, the 
‘disciplining’ of its citizens. In other words, cultural policy in Singapore is predicated 
upon the notion of controlling thought and behaviour of people, what American 
anthropologist Richard Kurin (1995) calls the capturing of ‘broad public sentiments’. A 
crucial part of this control and shaping of public sentiments is getting Singaporeans to 
imagine themselves as disciplined, law-abiding and patriotic citizens – not of the 
present alone, but of the future. According to David Birch, power-wielders in 
Singapore are perpetually eager to maintain “reality-myths which position Singapore 
as a society always in danger, always attempting by hard work and sacrifice to avert 
some future crisis” (Birch, 1993: 3). Elsewhere, Birch (1996) makes clear that cultural 
policy in Singapore is really a strategic policy of control, part of an overall economic 
and developmental policy insisting upon political and social stability at all cost. Indeed, 
Singaporean geographer Lily Kong (2000b) points out that in ‘pragmatic’ Singapore, 
the major motivation behind cultural policy is economic(s)
6. After all, as Kong 
explicates, the economic works in and through the socio-cultural (Kong, 2000b: 410). 
Therefore, as long as Singaporeans perceive culture and cultural policy from an 
economic standpoint, the government has little to fear in terms of policy non­
compliance or electoral backlash at the polls. 
Yet the emergence of younger, better-educated and more globalised middle-class 
Singaporeans has meant that the government can no longer treat the present 
population in the paternalistic ways of the past. Like large multinationals and 
conglomerates, bureaucracies around the world are now having to behave like good 
corporate citizens and take public relations and opinion seriously. Singapore is no 
exception. In recent years, the Prime Minister has utilised the annual National Day 
Rally speeches, now delivered towards the end of the celebratory month of August, to 
flesh out new ideas and prospective policy directions. This enables the authorities to 
mentally-prepare the people for policy changes, and/or to gauge public opinion 
sufficiently early so as to make an informed decision on the next political move. 
In 1999, Singapore 21: Together We Make The Difference, Singapore’s vision 
splendid of the 21
st century, was unveiled. The Singapore 21 vision, which aims to 
strengthen “the intangibles of society – social cohesion, political stability and the 
collective will, values and attitudes of a people” (Singapore 21, Preface), is first and 
foremost an exercise in economic and political expedience. Concomitantly, due to its 
call for Singaporeans to embrace attitudinal change, it is also, by extension, a 
statement of cultural policy. The government’s desire to increase the inflow of white-
collared workers from overseas to boost the republic’s competitiveness in the new 
information and knowledge-based economy provides the best illustration of Singapore 
21’s agenda for socio-cultural change. The concept of Singapore 21 was first 
promulgated by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in his 1997 National Day Rally 
Speech entitled ‘Global City, Best Home’. Among other things, Prime Minister Goh 
opined that just as are many Singaporeans living and working overseas, there is also 
a need for Singapore to “gather talent and make Singapore a cosmopolitan city” in the 
likes of London, New York and Hong Kong (Goh, 197: 28-39). Goh seized the  
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Apropos, this simple speech was to radically affect practically all government 
ministries and departments, including those managing the arts and cultural portfolios. 
Sure enough, less than two months after the prime minister’s speech, the project of 
Singapore 21 was launched to look into immigration policy, global labour 
arrangements and other equally pertinent national issues (Fernandez, 1997: 1). 
Although the plan to inject foreign know-how into Singapore is a sound policy insofar 
as economics is concerned, the prospect of born-and-bred Singaporean citizens 
losing their ‘rice-bowls’ to foreigners did not go down too well with many people. In 
short, it was an unpopular policy as xenophobia, ignorance as well as false patriotism 
soon began taking over. The government had to manage such overtly nationalistic 
sentiments not by withdrawing or reversing the policy, but by assuring every 
Singaporean that they would be well looked after in an increasingly global era. There 
was, in other words, a need to ‘popularise’ the policy position by mobilising the mass 
media, the press, government departments and statutory authorities and other public 
apparatuses to speak favourably on the issue. Veritably, Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong decided to give greater prominence to the issue of ‘gathering talent’ at the next 
National Day Rally Speech in 1998. This time, however, the term ‘foreign talent’ was 
used to remove possible traces of ambiguity. In a clear attempt at assuaging public 
discontentment, Goh articulated: 
For while we attract foreign talent and welcome foreigners who contribute to our 
economy, Singapore must always have a hard core of citizens, cohesive and 
totally committed to the country, around whom we can attract other talent and 
build a nation (Goh, 1998). 
As government departments have had ample time and feedback to prepare an all-
inclusive policy and vision statement, the final outcome, presented as five broad 
pillars of Singapore 21, was thus able to embody and alleviate some of the key 
concerns of the people
7.  The five pillars, designed to encompass an extensive range 
of issues and concerns, are: 
1.  Every Singaporean Matters; 
2.  Strong Families: Our Foundation and Our Future; 
3.  Opportunities for All; 
4.  The Singapore Heartbeat; and, 
5.  Active Citizens: Making a Difference to Society. 
Popularisation in the Singapore context does not imply that a policy is well-liked or 
fully supported by the people. Rather, the strategy of popularisation aims primarily to 
minimise opposition and attain, if necessary, blind or generally muted acceptance of 
the government’s supposedly flawless foresight and performance. The ‘struggle for 
the popular’, according to Tony Bennett’s analysis of Marxist cultural politics in Britain, 
is conceived as one of “seeking to displace current and actual forms of ‘the people’s’ 
culture with a different content” in the hope that the ‘people’, that is the sphere of the 
general public, might eventually be led to appropriate the new content, and therefore 
culture, as their own (Bennett, 1983: 17). In other words, popularisation is utilised as a 
strategy to manage socio-cultural change by attaining political legitimacy and public 
endorsement not necessarily for the betterment of society at large, but for the 
maintenance of power. With immense power to define the future mould of Singapore’s 
citizenry vis-à-vis the ‘foreign talent’ issue, and to construct the terms on which the 
people should be mobilised, Singapore 21 is undoubtedly a useful popularisation 
strategy of the PAP government in enacting and enforcing a cultural policy of control. 
The next section extends the notion of popularisation by looking at the employment 
and deployment of national songs within Singapore. Rather than perceive national 
songs as peripheral or mundane accompaniments to the annual National Day Parade 
and key celebratory events such as the National Day Rally Speech by the Prime 
Minister of the day, this chapter raises the (symbolic) profile of national songs by 
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their own right. In so doing, one might be able locate the populist aspects of Singa-
pore’s popularisation strategy in exacting further cultural and ideological control over 
the citizenry (Birch, 1996; Lee and Birch, 2000). 
Culture Reformed and Performed 
According to Leong, the admission of popular cultural items such as music, dance 
performances and pop-songs since the mid-1980s has incited greater participation 
from the masses (Leong, 1999: 4). But perhaps the most participatory element of 
National Day celebrations is the mass singing of national songs (along with the 
national anthem), which Leong describes as a clear “populist strategy to engage the 
masses” (Leong, 1999: 4). Leong’s view is echoed by feature writer Rosemary Chng 
when she notes most cogently in her preview of NDP 2000: 
The build-up for the NDP and National Day starts with the latest Singapore 
[national] song played over the TV and radio in July. There is also a Sing 
Singapore Committee… to discover and promote original songs written by 
Singaporeans. Songs such as ‘Count on Me Singapore’ and ‘Stand Up for 
Singapore’ have become NDP classics. Always sung at the NDP, they never 
fail to bring forth a swelling of national pride even for viewers at home  
(Chng, 2000: 18). 
Some of the better-known national songs, or ‘NDP classics’, include: 
•	 There’s a Part for everyone (1984) – part of the centralised and collective effort 
by the Singapore Government to launch Singapore’s ‘total defence’ foreign 
policy. 
•	 Stand Up for Singapore (1985; revised 2000) 
•	 Count on me, Singapore (1986; revised 2000) 
•	 We are Singapore (1987; revised 2000) 
•	 One People, One Nation, One Singapore (1989) 
•	 Home (1998) 
•	 Together (1999/2000) – to launch the Singapore 21 vision statement 
•	 Shine On Me (2000) 
•	 Majulah Singapura (1959; revised 2001) - Singapore’s National Anthem 
•	 We Will Get There (2002) 
These national songs are usually written and performed by well-known or identifiable 
local artistes or television/radio celebrities. The songs – and the artistes, who are 
really more interested in boosting their public persona and hence net economic 
worth – receive extensive publicity over local television, radio and the Internet through 
the month of August (sometimes beginning as early as July). In addition, these songs 
are generously commissioned and officially endorsed by the Ministry of Information, 
Communication and the Arts (MITA). As a result, national songs have become 
powerful mediators in the relay of nationalist messages and images to the 
Singaporean community as a whole. In recent years, not only are these songs aired 
over the dominant local mass media, they are recorded in digital format, distributed 
and sold in various formats, including compact disc (CDs), video-CD (VCD) and digital 
versatile disc (DVD).  Examples include: NDP 33:Remembering Our Past 33 National 
Day Parades (1999, VCD format); My Home, Singapore: Documentaries and music 
videos on Singapore (1999, VCD format); and, Singapore: One Voice (2000, VCD and 
DVD formats), which boasts a complete collection of national songs accompanied by 
high-quality music video clips. With these recordings, Singaporeans can not only have 
their favourite national songs ‘on-demand’, they are able to screen images of National 
Day and the nation within the private domain of their living rooms. The notion of the 
NDP as a ‘mediatory’ event as advanced by Velayutham (1995) thus takes on an 
additional cultural dimension. 
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music, is one that traverses both time (à la ‘NDP classics’) and space, since the live-
telecasting of the NDP reaches out to media audiences, whether they are watching at 
home or in attendance at the Padang (field), the Parade ground outside Singapore’s 
City Hall. To ensure that home-viewers get the best of a live-telecast parade, lyrics of 
national songs that are being sung are subtitled in real time so as to encourage 
participation in a sing-along fashion à la karaoke (Lim, 1999: 133). More recently, the 
lyrics, soundtrack and music video clips of most national songs have also been 
lodged on cyberspace, on the ‘Sing Singapore’ website
8.  This website vividly 
captures the essence and imagination of Singapore’s high-tech status by allowing 
listeners to download any national song in MP3 format into their personal computers 
and/or portable music devices. Any accompanying music video may also be 
downloaded for future viewing. The National Arts Council (NAC), the statutory body 
tasked with the responsibility of managing these national songs, has spared little effort 
in making them widely and easily available to Singaporeans at home and away. After 
all, making these songs easily accessible via all means possible is clearly one of the 
most, if not the most, rudimentary aspect of promotion and popularisation of the 
nation. 
In a landmark study into the background and traditions of ‘national music’, Carl Engel 
contends that the form and spirit of popular music compositions vary greatly in 
different nations. From an anthropological perspective, the study of national music 
and songs is useful as it illustrates the distinctive characteristics of various countries 
and their people (see also Williams, 1963). Engel notes the significance of national 
songs in marking out or promoting a particular period or event in a nation’s history 
(1866: 12). According to Engel: 
The term National Music implies that music, which, appertaining to a nation or 
tribe, whose individual emotions and passions it expresses, exhibits certain 
peculiarities more or less characteristic, which distinguishes it from the music of 
any other nation or tribe (Engel, 1866: 1).
9 
Engel also submits that the more a nation advances in civilisation and self-esteem, 
the more it seeks to symbolise and express its feelings about itself via popular songs, 
folklore and other monuments. Engel’s observation is reflected with cogency in the 
Renaissance City Report (2000), a government report which outlines the strategic 
steps that will be taken to revitalise Singapore’s arts and cultural industry.
10 On a 
global scale, Singapore aspires to become, as the title of the Report suggests, a 
premier renaissance city of the arts of the 21
st century, benchmarked against the likes 
of New York, London, Melbourne and Glasgow. On a local level, however, the aim is 
to ‘strengthen the Singapore Heartbeat’ or its collective identity through the 
expression of ‘Singapore stories in culture and the arts’ (Renaissance City Report: 
Executive Summary). National songs perform a similar function as the lyrics and 
themes tend to focus on the distinctive aspects – the ‘peculiarities’ – of Singaporean 
culture and identity. In this way, the discourse of national songs become a part of the 
physical, social, cultural and political ‘renaissance’ or (re)construction of Singapore 
nationhood. 
The emotive and heart-warming appeal of the national song Home (1998), for 
instance, attempts to capture, as Engel (1866) points out, the peculiarities and other 
intangible aspects of being Singaporean. Written by reputable singer-songwriter Dick 
Lee and performed by local pop-singer Kit Chan, this melodious ballad suggests that 
Singapore is ‘home’ wherever one chooses to go.
11 The lyrics of Home read: 
Wherever I am feeling low, I look around me and I know 
There’s a place that will stay within me, wherever I may choose to go 
I will always recall the city, know every street and shore 
Sail down the river which brings us life, winding through my Singapore 
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This is home truly, where I know I must be 
Where my dream waits for me, where that river always flow 
This is home surely, as my senses tell me 
This is where I won’t be alone, for this is where I know it’s home 
When there are troubles to go through, we’ll find a way to start anew 
There is comfort in the knowledge that home’s about its people too 
So we’ll build our dreams together, just like we’ve done before 
Just like the river which brings us like, there’ll always be Singapore 
In this song, ‘home’ is depicted both as a metaphysical construct as well as a 
geographical reality. It a place that stays ‘within’ one’s ‘senses’ while at the same time 
an urbanised ‘city’ with ‘its people’, a flowing ‘river’, ‘street and shore’ and so on. In 
short, the song suggests that Singaporean identity does not simply consist of rooting 
oneself geo-physically on Singapore soil, it is more important to stay passionately true 
to Singapore, for it is where ‘my dreams wait for me, where the river always flow’. 
The easy-to-understand lyrics of Home re-enact the aforementioned Singapore 21 
vision, a document which, among other agendas, calls for Singaporeans to be 
cosmopolitan or global in their outlook. It is thus consistent with Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong’s call to encourage foreign talents and thus embrace cosmopolitanism so 
as to turn Singapore into a truly vibrant global city akin to the renaissance era (Goh, 
1997 and 1998). While not overtly expressing it, the song also issues a call for skilled 
Singaporeans residing or working overseas to return to the ‘streets and shore’ of 
homeland Singapore. Concomitantly, those Singaporeans who do not venture abroad, 
euphemistically referred to by Singapore politicians and the mass media as the 
‘heartlanders’, are also assured of their place in a society that is ‘about its people too’. 
The national song Home, in effect, popularises and performs Singapore’s current 
cultural policy statement as exemplified in Singapore 21 as well as the Renaissance 
City Report. Putting the ideals of the government into a national song not only 
entertains, it fulfils erstwhile aims to further root Singaporeans – near or far – to their 
‘imagined’ beloved nation, while signalling and preparing the people for further cultural 
(policy) changes ahead.  In this case, one can expect the city, street and shore to be 
filled with non, or more appropriately ‘new’, overseas-born and/or foreign-trained 
‘Singaporeans’. A ‘patriotic’ Singaporean who calls Singapore ‘home’ must therefore 
‘go through troubles’ and accept changes graciously, or be left behind, if not 
economically, then socio-culturally. Such is the new social and cultural ‘reality’ of 
Singapore as proposed by the Singapore 21 vision. 
The Ministry of Information and the Arts’ re-make of the 1985 ‘NDP classic’ Stand Up 
For Singapore for the National Day celebrations of 2000 is perhaps the most blatant 
attempt at popularising Singapore as a ‘hip’ and ‘cool’ cosmopolitan city which 
embraces culture and the arts. It is also the most illustrative as the music video, made 
to accompany the new revamped version, was a radical departure from convention. 
While the original video-clip of the song is most strait-laced and austere in its 
message of how and why one ought to ‘stand up’ and support Singapore, the new 
release is the exact opposite. Energetic and youthful in every respect, the new video 
clip is certain to make heads turn. Whether this is done in disdain or admiration is not 
so important, its ability to signify and portray a culturally vibrant city-state is more 
lasting and potent. 
In Stand Up For Singapore (2000), the four lead singers (two males and two females), 
probably in their late-teens to mid-twenties, are seen disco-dancing – in the subway 
station, on the streets, in the parklands, on the rooftop of a skyscraper and other 
aesthetic locales – to a jazzed-up version of the song. In a video which (over) 
emphasises the vigour of youthful Singapore, one of the lead male singers even spots 
long and unkempt hair. This caricature is somewhat shocking if one recalls the well-
circulated rumour that men with long hair entering Singapore have had their hair 
trimmed by airport customs officers. Furthermore, to this day, male officers in the civil  
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hairdo to work. This indicates, among other things, that the authorities are now 
prepared to overlook rules that are dated and less relevant from an economic 
standpoint (Kong, 2000b). The belief is that the new economy demands 
entrepreneurial and artistic creativity, and by showing that Singaporeans are able to 
loosen up, foreign executives and businessmen would be persuaded to invest in the 
country. The closing sequence of the video, which depicts a group of police officers, 
military men and other uniformed staff joining the lead singers in jumping and dancing 
to the music and beat, bears testament to this newfound ‘truth’. One could be 
mistaken to think that the song was entitled ‘jump up’ or ‘hang loose’ for Singapore! 
Stand Up For Singapore (2000) exemplifies the Singaporean government’s 
popularisation strategy par excellence. Not only does this rendition debunk many of 
the myths associated with Singapore, it is successful insofar as it is able to promote 
Singapore as a truly progressive city of the new millennium. It is also able to 
didactically impart this new social and cultural image to the younger generation of 
Singaporeans – many of whom risk defecting into the dubious category of the 
‘unbelievers’ (Leong, 1999) – clearly the prime target audience of this national song 
and video campaign. The popularisation of Singapore as young, energetic, (pro) 
active, vibrant and ‘cool’ is aimed at displacing the old perceptions of Singapore as a 
sterile city-state of boring, economy-centric leaders and humourless people. The 
gradual perfection of the popularisation strategy means that Singapore’s cultural 
policy of control to achieve rapid economic growth and development is no longer 
visibly or overtly enforced, since after all, the material fruits of economic success are 
openly manifested for all to see. Instead, citizens are urged to actively participate and 
support, thus legitimising, the state’s panoramic vision, whether this comes in the form 
of a ministerial speech, the Singapore 21 blueprint (1999) or the Renaissance City 
Report (2000). In the final analysis, popularising Singapore is about attaining political 
legitimacy and longevity for the ruling party. As Kong elucidates most cogently: 
[T]he ultimate concern is to develop in Singaporeans a love for their country, a 
sense of patriotism, and a willingness to support the ruling elite who have led 
the country through the short years since independence to tremendous 
development (Kong, 2000b: 418). 
In this regard, the ‘reality’ of Singapore has not really changed. 
Conclusion 
The PAP government recognises that popularising Singapore via parades, carnivals, 
national songs, and other modes of entertainment are extremely effective in 
mobilising the people to support government-led initiatives and policies. As discursive 
symbols of nationhood, the consumption of these popular cultural items has the 
potential to raise public consciousness regarding the framing of a communitarian 
culture and national identity, a noble agenda that is likely to find little resistance 
(Chua, 1995). As a result, the popularisation of national songs, for instance, a project 
which began in the 1980s, has intensified in the late 1990s, and looks set to continue 
into the 2000s. 
Putting the money where the mouth is, the government has poured in large sums to 
commission the audio and video production of new songs. In a typically Singaporean 
fashion, the older favourites, including Stand Up For Singapore, have undergone 
major revamps with new arrangements and innovative new music videos made to 
captivate and capture new audiences.
12 In 2001, the much-revered national anthem 
Majulah Singapura received a makeover to the tune of S$200,000 to make it “more 
accessible to all Singaporeans” (MITA Press Release, Jan 19, 2001).
13 The official 
announcement emanating from the Ministry of Information and the Arts proclaimed 
that:  
A new recording of the National Anthem, Majulah Singapura, with a grander 
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Singaporeans.  The new recording also comes with a revised English 
translation of the lyrics so that he meaning of the Anthem can be better 
understood (MITA Press Release, Jan 19, 2001). 
Like other national songs, the new rendition of the national anthem comes complete 
with its own music video and music score sheets. In addition, to ensure that the 
anthem becomes ‘more popular’ with all Singaporeans, seven different versions of the 
anthem, including orchestral, choir/solo and piano, have been recorded for teaching 
and singing purposes (see Tan, 2001a/b). Indeed, no stones have been left unturned. 
The popularisation of the national anthem fulfils two objectives. First, the song has 
been given a slower tempo and transposed down a tone from the key of G to F to 
make it easier for people to sing it. Children, who are required to sing the anthem at 
school assembly every morning, would thus be able to reach the notes comfortably 
and, hopefully, be moved by it. The second, and arguably more pertinent, objective is 
the fact that a revised English translation of the lyrics has also been produced. As 
Birch (1993: 1) has observed, while most are able to sing the song ‘with pride’, very 
few actually understand what the Malay lyrics mean. Singapore’s desire to spurn all 
things Malaysian means that it is important to remedy this language barrier not by 
teaching conversational Malay, but by translating it into English, the neutral lingua 
franca of Singapore. After all, Majulah Singapura, or ‘Onward Singapore’ in English, 
symbolises and celebrates Singapore’s newfound freedom – first from British colonial 
rule, then from Malay/sian ethnic dominance. The ‘reality’ of 9
th August is thus 
embedded within the discourse of national songs and cultural policy. 
The popularisation of the nation in celebrations and the singing of national songs 
and anthem is a strategy not only for the long-term evocation and sustenance of 
nationalist pride, it has an immediate effect in reinforcing the hegemony of the 
economic and political. While new policy statements and strategies may be 
devised from time to time, the aim of producing and/or maintaining docile but 
economically-useful and politically-compliant citizens remains the zeitgeist of 
cultural policy-making in Singapore. For reasons highlighted throughout this 
paper, the strategy of popularising policy is the preferred mode of social, cultural 
and political engagement, at least for the foreseeable future. 
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